Previous research suggests that …rms that penetrate foreign markets reduce entry costs for other potential exporters, generating export spillovers. This paper continues this line of research by developing a general empirical framework to study whether export participation decisions at the …rm level are in ‡uenced by the characteristics of …rms that belong to a common reference group (de…ned by industry and geographical region). It is shown that, in the presence of entry costs, group composition a¤ects the degree of state dependence of individual export decisions, thus making its impact contingent on export status. I test this idea applying the dynamic panel data estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998) to a data set of Argentine manufacturing …rms. Group composition in ‡uences individual export decisions and most of this e¤ect is channeled through entry costs. However, these non-market interactions are not driven by export spillovers, but by average …rm size at the group level. JEL Classi…cation codes: F14, F15.
Introduction
Politicians and policymakers often consider access to export markets central to promoting growth and development. Governments in both rich and poor countries set up o¢ ces and invest resources to assist …rms in selling goods and services abroad, believing that helping exporters is good policy.
Economists, on the other hand, have only recently begun to gain a better understanding of the role of …rms in mediating countries'imports and exports. The increased availability of microdata in recent years has spurred a growing literature concerned with a range of aspects of …rm level adjustment to trade liberalization that complement traditional theories of comparative advantage, increasing returns and consumer love of variety. 1 One dimension which has received particularly close attention is the identi…cation of the factors that determine export participation decisions. What explains the export behavior of …rms? It is now clear that a combination of entry costs and heterogeneity in the underlying characteristics of …rms explains why only some …rms export (Bernard and Jensen, 2004 ). At the most basic level, microdata have revealed two empirical regularities. First, exporters are larger, more productive and more skill-intensive than non-exporters, even before exporting begins (Bernard et al., 1995) . Second, export status (i.e. prior export experience) has a substantial e¤ect on current export participation, which is consistent with the existence of sunk entry costs in exports markets (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) . These …ndings have, in turn, stimulated the development of theoretical models showing how …rm heterogeneity and sunk costs generates the self-selection of the most productive …rms into export markets (Melitz, 2003 and Bernard et al., 2003 among others) .
While most of the research at the micro level has centered on analyzing which characteristics of a …rm a¤ect its propensity to export, a number of studies have taken a di¤erent approach by focusing 1 Bernard et al. (2007) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007) are two recent surveys of this literature.
on whether the characteristics of …rms located close to each other play a role in shaping individual entry decisions. Intuitively, proximity among …rms could in ‡uence individual export decisions if it enables interactions such as learning or imitation. 2 The literature on export spillovers searches for a speci…c learning interaction generated by exporters and in ‡uencing the export decisions of …rms belonging to the same reference group. The reference group describes the space of interaction (i.e. who interacts with who) and is usually de…ned in terms of product similarity and geographical proximity in the export spillovers literature. In particular, these studies suggest that …rms that penetrate foreign markets reduce entry costs for other potential exporters in the same industry and region, either through learning e¤ects or by establishing commercial linkages. However, in a recent survey, see Greenaway and Kneller (2007, p. 143) conclude that the evidence of export spillovers is "somewhat mixed".
The objective of this paper is to re-examine the role of group composition (i.e. variation in the characteristics of the reference group) as a determinant of export decisions while addressing three issues that, to the best of my knowledge, have been overlooked in previous research. First, nine out of the eleven papers surveyed in Greenaway and Kneller (2007, table 2) apply static estimation frameworks to analyze entry decisions. Modeling the …rm's export decision in the presence of entry costs as in Bernard and Jensen (2004) , I illustrate the well-known result (Roberts and Tybout, 1997 ) that a static approach is incompatible with the existence of entry costs in export markets, resulting in misspeci…ed empirical models and complicating the interpretation of the results.
The remaining two studies reviewed in that survey, Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) apply dynamic frameworks and …nd weak evidence of export spillovers. 3 However, a 2 Note that, in principle, learning does not require …rms to cooperate actively; the observation of the actions of competitors could potentially reveal information that facilitates entry to export markets. Aitken et al. (1997, p. 104) provide an example.
3 Clerides et al (1998) examine the role of exporter concentration within regions and industries on the export decision of Colombian plants. They …nd only weakly signi…cant evidence that the presence of other exporters makes it easier for domestically oriented …rms to break into foreign markets, but …nd no spillovers reducing marginal costs maintained assumption in these studies (and, in general, in the export spillovers literature) is that, once di¤erences in productivity across …rms and prior export experience have been controlled for, the in ‡uence of group composition on export decisions is the same for every …rm belonging to the reference group. A second goal of this paper is to show that this assumption is inappropriate for testing whether exporter concentration reduces entry costs in export markets. On the contrary, if group composition a¤ects entry costs, its impact on individual decisions should depend on the …rm's export status. The intuition behind this result is that any e¤ect of group composition on entry costs should only in ‡uence the decision of …rms considering whether to start exporting or not, and be irrelevant in the export decision of …rms with recent experience in export markets (since, by de…nition, the latter have already incurred entry costs).
As mentioned above, the literature on export spillovers has exclusively focused on whether individual export decisions are driven by the concentration of exporters in the reference group.
However, interactions could be related to other features of group composition. Therefore, a third objective of this paper is to provide a general framework to account for alternative sources of nonmarket interactions. As an example, instead of learning from other exporters, a …rm considering entry could plausibly learn from the R&D investment of …rms in its reference group (perhaps, by learning new ways to upgrade its products, making them more appealing to foreign consumers).
Another alternative is for …rms to become more productive (and, as a result, more prone to exporting) by tapping into a group-speci…c stock of innovations that have already been made by past innovators in the group. The idea of …rms catching up to a technological frontier is applied by Aghion and Howitt (2006) to study the role of technological spillovers in explaining growth rates across countries, but it can also be used to think about the transfer of knowledge within …rms of exporters. Using a panel of U.S manufacturing …rms, Bernard and Jensen (2004) …nd signi…cant entry costs to foreign markets but negligible market access spillovers from export activity of …rms in the same industry or region.
belonging to the same group.
In general, sorting out which features of group composition generate interactions on individual behavior is likely to have policy implications. As an example, if …rms learn from exporters (as suggested in the spillovers literature), government support to any single exporter will generate an indirect bene…t for other …rms considering entry to export markets. But if …rms learn how to export as a result of the R&D investment of other …rms located nearby, then resources allocated to export promotion may end up being socially more productive if redirected to R&D support programs.
Overall, exploring the link between individual export decisions and group outcomes is appealing for a number of reasons. First, from a general perspective, because it is in line with a relatively recent and growing interest among economists of various …elds in understanding how social factors beyond the marketplace a¤ect individual decisions and outcomes. 4 Second, because it may provide a better foundation for evaluating speci…c policy issues, such as the case of government support to exporters. As shown in Melitz (2003) , access to export markets leads to inter-…rm resource reallocation towards the more productive …rms, contributing to welfare gains from trade liberalization.
If entry decisions at the …rm level are in ‡uenced by non-market interactions, then there is likely to be a positive role for government intervention in, for example, coordinating or promoting entry to export markets.
The …rm-level data used for empirical analysis in this paper is a representative sample of manufacturing …rms in Argentina between 1992 and 2001. Argentina has substantially increased its openness to foreign trade during the 1990s and entry into foreign markets has since been seen as a critical issue for the long run success of this policy. Therefore, these data provide an interesting and relevant ground for analyzing entry into export markets.
The econometric approach relies on the GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and the dynamic e¤ects generated by entry costs into export markets. This approach is also convenient for dealing with the potential endogeneity of group composition, including the re ‡ection problem that arises in the identi…cation of the e¤ect of group behavior on individual export decisions (Manski, 1993) .
Brie ‡y, the results indicate that variation group composition plays an important role in the determination of individual export decisions, after controlling for the e¤ect of the …rm-level determinants usually emphasized in the empirical micro literature (past export experience and …rm heterogeneity). As suggested by the export spillovers literature, most of this e¤ect is channeled through its in ‡uence on entry costs and is, therefore, contingent on export status. However, group composition e¤ects are not driven by the concentration of exporters, but by average …rm size in the group. Furthermore, the bene…t (in terms of increased likelihood of exporting) of belonging to a group characterized by a higher average …rm size is larger for small …rms than for large …rms. If average …rm size at the group level is viewed as proxying for a group-speci…c stock of past innovations or technological frontier, a possible interpretation of the result is that non-market interactions lead to a "backwardness advantage" -Gerschenkron (1965)-that, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of exporting in smaller …rms.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section presents a model of entry into export markets with sunk costs in order to characterize export decisions at the …rm level and to illustrate di¤erent channels through which non-market interactions could exert their in ‡uence on individual behavior. Section 3 describes the data set and presents descriptive statistics of the export decisions of manufacturing …rms during the 1990s in Argentina. Section 4 o¤ers a preliminary exploration of the links between individual export behavior and group composition that can be found the raw data. Section 5 begins with a discussion on the identi…cation of non-market interactions and then sets up the econometric model to formally analyze the determinants of export decisions. Section 6 presents the estimation results and section 7 concludes.
A model of entry into export markets with sunk costs
In order to examine whether group composition generates non-market interactions that reduce entry costs to potential exporters, it is crucial to apply an empirical framework designed to identify the e¤ects of entry costs on export participation decision at the …rm level. In this section, I present a simple model of export decisions that explicitly incorporates the role of entry costs in export markets, a modi…ed version of the models in Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) . 5 As an additional feature, group composition is introduced into the analysis in a stark way with the goal of illustrating its potential impact on export decisions.
The model provides a useful framework that will guide the speci…cation and interpretation of the empirical analysis in sections 4 and 5. As shown below, a consequence of the existence of entry costs is that the export decision of a …rm will exhibit state dependence. This implies that a proper econometric evaluation of the in ‡uence of group composition on entry costs requires modelling export decisions in a dynamic framework. An additional feature of the model is that it explicitly separates the role of pro…t heterogeneity and entry costs. This is convenient to allow for di¤erent channels through which non-market interactions could in ‡uence individual entry decisions.
In particular, the model also shows that the in ‡uence of group composition on individual export decisions is contingent on export status, a result that plays a central role in the empirical analysis.
Consider a …rm i that in any given period can earn pro…ts by selling in the domestic (d) 5 The description of the model closely follows that in Clerides et al (1998). and/or export (f ) markets. Let this …rm belong to a reference group g 2 G, where g indexes a speci…c industry and geographical location where the …rm carries out its production activities in the domestic market. G is the …nite set of all groups producing in this market. Assume that the …rm's pro…t function is separable by letting k g; represent the pro…t obtained by selling in market k = fd; f g in this period. 6 Let the per-period, …xed costs of being an exporter (e.g. dealing with customs and intermediaries) be M g; . Then, the …rm will earn positive pro…ts from exporting in whenever
Accordingly, if there were no start-up costs associated with becoming an exporter (and no learningby-exporting e¤ects) …rms would simply participate in foreign markets whenever this condition was satis…ed. However, as noted in Bernard and Jensen (2004) , the existence of an entry cost (denoted by g; ) makes the …rm's entry decision forward-looking and opens up the possibility that …rms export today in anticipation of cost reductions, or foreign demand increases, later on. In particular, it may be optimal to keep exporting even if f g; < M g; since, by remaining in the export market, the …rm avoids future re-entry costs.
Perhaps the simplest possible way to introduce non-market interactions in this framework is to model , M and k as functions of a group-speci…c vector S g; that summarizes characteristics of group g that are thought to generate externalities. As a result, g; (S g; ), M g; M (S g; ) and k g; k (z k g; ; S g; ) where, in addition, z k g; captures both individual characteristics of the …rm and usual exogenous demand shifters in k (income level, exchange rates and goods' prices).
These functions provide a reduced-form link between individual export decisions and group composition through di¤erent channels; i.e. through their in ‡uence on marginal, …xed and entry costs of exporting.
6 Pro…t separability can be derived from a model of monopolistically competitive …rms that can price discriminate between foreign and domestic buyers, and produce at constant marginal costs -see Clerides et al (1998) .
In empirical studies, S g; is usually a measure of the concentration of exporters in group g, period . In general, non-market interactions could be generated by export decisions or by other exogenous characteristics of …rms belonging to reference group g (such as the proportion of foreign …rms in g). An implicit assumption in this formulation is that …rms interact only with …rms belonging to the same group. I also assume throughout this section that the number of …rms belonging to each group g 2 G is large so that, when solving their export decision problem, …rms can ignore the impact of their decision on the vector of non-market interactions S g; . In other words, …rms take S g; as given, although some of its components could be endogenous variables determined in the general equilibrium -for example, if S g; contains the average export decision of …rms in group g.
For the purposes of this paper, however, I will only study the partial equilibrium of this model.
Letting y be a binary indicator equal to one if the …rm decides to export in , assume that in an initial period t the …rm chooses a sequence of export participation decisions fy t+ g 1 =0 in order to maximize the expected value of future discounted pro…ts:
V t (y t 1 ; z g;t ; S g;t ) max
where E t is an expectations operator conditioned on the set of information available at time t and is the one-period discount rate. This formulation implies that producers who exit the market and re-enter face the same start-up costs as producers who never exported. 7 Note that the entry cost, After evaluating the right-hand side of this equation at y t = 0 and y t = 1, comparing the resulting expressions and recognizing that h t and g;t are functionally dependent on S g;t , the …rm's export decision in period t can be written as
where 1[:] denotes an indicator function equals 1 if the expression is true and zero otherwise, and
Equation (1) implies that incumbent exporters continue exporting whenever current net operating pro…ts from exports plus the expected discounted payo¤ from remaining an exporter (which includes avoiding the entry cost next period) is positive, and non-exporters begin exporting whenever this sum, net of entry costs, is positive. Therefore, the existence of sunk costs ( g;t > 0)
generates state-dependence, introducing a dynamic component in the export decision of the …rm. Equation (1) suggests two distinct channels through which non-market interactions may in ‡u-ence entry decisions. Firstly, through net pro…ts h t . This e¤ect would arise if, for example, the presence of other exporters in the same group g increases the availability of specialized capital and labor inputs, lowering the …rm's marginal cost of production. I'll refer to this channel as a productivity spillover. A second channel of externalities operates on the sunk cost of access to export markets, generating an entry cost spillover.
This result bears important implications for the empirical analysis of non-market interactions and entry to export markets. First, it shows that in order to conduct a proper evaluation of the existence of entry cost spillovers it is necessary to identify the degree of state dependence on individual export decisions. Second, as opposed to productivity spillovers, only the decisions of …rms with no prior export experience can be in ‡uenced by entry cost spillovers -since only these …rms need to incur the sunk cost to export in period t. In other words, the in ‡uence of group composition S g;t on individual export decisions is contingent on export status. These two observations play an important role in the empirical analysis of this paper.
Export decisions in Argentina during the 1990s
The data set used in the empirical analysis comes from a variety of sources that are described in detail in the appendix, section A. Brie ‡y, the …rm-level data is a random sample of manufacturing …rms in Argentina, collected during two Innovation Surveys carried out by I.N.D.E.C. (Argentina's National Statistical Agency). The …rst survey provides information on 1639 …rms in 1992 and 1996, while the second survey collected information on 1688 …rms in 1998 and 2001 Lugones 1998, 2003) . The rest of this section presents summary statistics of exporters and non-exporters, and documents the persistence of entry decisions in the data. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of exporters and non-exporters in the Argentine manufacturing industry after pooling all observations for 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2001 . Exporters comprise slightly more that half of the observations in the sample (53%). In line with previous research, exporters are clearly larger and better performing …rms, invest more heavily in capital and R&D, and demand relatively more skilled employees than non-exporters. The presence of foreign …rms among exporters is substantially larger as well. Table 2 shows the distribution of …rms and exporters across provinces in Argentina. The activity of …rms is highly concentrated in the three most populated provinces, Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Santa Fe. These provinces account for 64% of the country's population in 2001, over 85% of the observations and almost 90% of the exporters in the data set.
Exporters and non-exporters
3.2 Transitions in and out of exporting and the persistence of entry decisions Figure B .3 shows the magnitude of the ‡ows in and out of exporting that occurred in the manufacturing industry during the 1990s. While most of the …rms where non-exporters in 1992, the reverse occurred later in the sample. The number of exporters peaked in 1996, driven by both high entry and very low exit rates. The reduction in the number of exporters in 1998 comes more from a rise in exits than a decline in entry. On average, 15.6% of exporters were entrants in any given year (i.e. they were non-exporters in the previous sample year). Similarly, 12.1% of non-exporters were, on average, previous exporters. The degree of variation in export decisions displayed in this sample is similar to that reported in Bernard and Jensen (2004, p. 563) for U.S. manufacturing …rms during 1984-1992 -their average entry and exit rates are 13.9% and 12.6%, respectively.
Though a substantial number of …rms enter and exit the export market each year and exporting became more prevalent over time, there is still a large degree of persistence in the export status of an individual plant. Columns (1) and (2) (3) and (4) of table 3 report the predicted rates of persistence if exits and entrants were chosen randomly according to the calculated annual transition rates. At all horizons, the predicted persistence is substantially lower than that observed in the sample. From this we conclude that there is a high degree of reentry by former exporters, that is, they have a higher probability of reentering export markets. Similarly, former non-exporters have a higher probability to continue producing exclusively for the domestic market. This is consistent with the predictions of the export decision model presented in section 2. The empirical analysis intends to examine whether this persistence in exporting results from …rm heterogeneity or from sunk costs, and the extent to which these sources of persistence are a¤ected by the characteristics of reference groups.
4 Why Do Firms Behave Similarly?
A Look at the Raw Data
I now turn to exploring the link between individual entry decisions and group export behavior in the raw data. To characterize the latter, I'll measure the concentration of exporters in reference group g by Y ( i)gt , the proportion of exporters in group g and year t excluding …rm i,
where N g is the number of …rms in g. 8 Alternatively, Y ( i)gt can be interpreted as the average export decision in group g. How are groups de…ned? In this paper, I follow the usual practice in the literature and assume that non-market interactions operate within groups of …rms that produce similar products and are located close to each other. Product similarity is measured at the 3-digit ISIC level of aggregation and geographical locations are de…ned by provincial boundaries. 9
A starting point in the analysis is the observation that a …rm's decision to enter export markets
The …ndings of this section are robust to changing the level of industry aggregation to 2 and 4 digits of ISIC.
is positively correlated with the decisions of …rms belonging to the same group. Column (1) in 
where t is a time-varying intercept common to all groups and u igt captures variation in export decisions that is orthogonal to Y ( The …nding that members of the same group tend to behave similarly is an empirical regularity observed in di¤erent contexts in the social sciences. Researchers have hypothesized that this observation could be driven by interactions in which the propensity of an agent to behave in some ways varies positively with the prevalence of this behavior in the group. As noted in Manski (2000), according to the context, these interactions may be alternatively called "peer in ‡uences", "neighborhood e¤ects" or "herd behavior", among others.
As mentioned in the introduction, a maintained assumption in the export spillovers literature is that, once di¤erences in productivity across …rms and prior export experience have been accounted for, the in ‡uence of group composition on export decisions is the same for every …rm belonging to a given group. While this assumption may be reasonable in other contexts, the analysis presented in section 2 showed that it is inappropriate for testing whether exporter concentration reduces entry costs in export markets. If group composition a¤ects entry costs, its impact should depend on a …rm's export status. The intuition behind this result is that any e¤ect of group composition on entry costs should only in ‡uence the decision of …rms considering whether to start exporting or not, and be irrelevant in the export decision of …rms with recent experience in export markets. In other words, we should expect the correlation illustrated in …gure B.4 to be contingent on export status.
As a …rst step towards analyzing this hypothesis more formally, it is interesting to verify if it can be observed in the raw data. This requires introducing y igt 1 , export status, in equation 3 and allowing its coe¢ cient gt to depend on the average export decision in group g; that is,
In this way, the e¤ect of Y ( i)gt on y igt can now operate through a direct and an indirect channel, captured by y and y , respectively. Substituting gt in equation 3 yields,
The results of the OLS estimation of equation 4 are presented in column (2) of table 4. The coe¢ cient of interest, y , is negative and highly signi…cant. This has two main implications. First, consistent with the analysis in section 2, the correlation illustrated in …gure B.4 is contingent on export status. In particular, a higher concentration of exporters is correlated with a smaller in ‡uence of export status on export decisions. This is illustrated in …gure B.5, a plot of the …tted values of this regression against Y ( i)gt , contingent on export status. The vertical distance between the …tted lines illustrates how the persistence of export decisions at the …rm level, gt , decreases with export concentration. Second, a negative sign of y together with the fact that y is positive and signi…cant also implies that the export decision of …rms considering whether to start exporting in period t is more sensitive to changes in export concentration than the decision of …rms that exported in period t 1. 10 Note in …gure B.5 that the …tted line for t 1 exporters is almost ‡at.
In fact, a Wald test of y + y = 0 in equation 4 cannot be rejected at conventional signi…cance levels. 11
Three Challenges for the Empirical Analysis
Overall, a simple examination of the raw data points to the importance of allowing the in ‡uence of group behavior to be contingent on export status and, as a consequence, to operate indirectly through its e¤ect on the degree of persistence in export decisions. The literature on export spillovers, on the other hand, has focused on studying the uncontingent e¤ect (i.e. independent of export status), albeit after controlling for export status as in Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) .
The primary objective of the empirical analysis is to assess whether the geographical concen- First, it must disentangle persistence in export decisions due to state dependence (export status) from persistence due to unobserved heterogeneity in …rm characteristics. 12 The analysis in section 2 implies that entry costs generate state dependence. The econometric analysis thus needs to isolate this source of persistence as a prior condition to evaluating the relevance of export spillovers on entry costs.
A second task is to isolate an exogenous source of variation in group export propensity (and, Heckman (1978 Heckman ( , 1981b Heckman ( , 1981a ) discusses these two sources of serial persistence. in general, in group composition). Although export spillovers within provinces would generate feedback loops in export decisions that stimulate the agglomeration of exporters such as in …gures B.4 and B.5, other alternative mechanisms could be at work. A most natural alternative is to imagine that some provinces provide …rms with institutional and economic environments that are more conducive to exporting than others. This could be driving the agglomeration of …rms described in table 2. In this story, the geographical characteristics of provinces and the quality of both local public goods and provincial governments are likely to play key roles. Alternatively, the comovement of export decisions could be simply re ‡ecting …rms adjusting to changes in fundamentals across industries, such as export prices or transport costs. These issues are discussed in detail in section 5.2.
Conditional on the previous two, a …nal task of the empirical analysis is to identify the source of non-market interactions. The concentration of exporters may still be driven by non-market interactions, but of a di¤erent kind than suggested in the export spillovers literature. Exporter agglomeration may be related to features of group composition other than export propensity. Instead of learning from other exporters, a …rm considering entry could plausibly learn from the R&D investment of …rms in the same group (perhaps, by learning new ways to upgrade its products, making them more appealing to foreign consumers). Another plausible alternative is for …rms to become more productive (and, as a result, more prone to exporting) by tapping into a stock of innovations that have already been made by past innovators belonging to a given group, catching up to a group-speci…c technological frontier. There is no reason to rule out these possibilities a priori and, as suggested in the introduction, sorting out which features of group composition generate interactions on individual behavior is likely to have policy implications.
As a summary of this section, stripped to its basics, the correlations shown in …gures B.4 and B.5 could be driven by (Manski (2000) ): a) Endogenous interactions, wherein the export propensity of a …rm varies with the export propensity at the group level -the export spillovers hypothesis. b) Exogenous interactions, wherein the export propensity of a …rm varies with other exogenous characteristics of group composition. c) Correlated e¤ects, wherein …rms in the same group tend to behave similarly because the have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional environments (including market fundamentals).
Notice that while endogenous and exogenous e¤ects represent genuine non-market interactions between …rms of the same group, correlated e¤ects operate entirely at the individual level and, therefore, should not be regarded as any form of interaction.
Econometric Analysis
In this section, I start by presenting the econometric framework for analyzing export decisions at the …rm level. I then turn to a discussion of the identi…cation of non-market interactions that leads to the empirical strategy used in this paper.
A Linear Speci…cation
As a …rst step in setting up the econometric model, I follow Bernard and Jensen (2004) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) and express y t in equation 2 as a reduced linear form of observable …rm and group-speci…c (including group composition) characteristics and unobservable idiosyncratic …rm e¤ects. Furthermore, as shown in section 2, if non-market interactions in ‡uence entry costs gt , its e¤ect on individual entry decisions is contingent on the export status of a …rm. Therefore, I allow gt to depend linearly on group composition. As a result, the …rm's export decision in equation 1 can be expressed as
for t = 1; :::; T; where
As in previous sections, reference groups g 2 G are de…ned by product similarity and geo- Using the notation in section 2, y igt is the export decision of …rm i, in group g 2 G and period t; (z igt ; u igt ) are …rm-speci…c attributes that directly a¤ect y igt ; x gt are attributes characterizing group g in period t; t controls for aggregate time e¤ects; S gt describes the composition of the set of …rms in group g during period t. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, non-market interactions arising from group composition S gt can comprise both endogenous and exogenous e¤ects. While endogenous e¤ects are generated by the export decisions of …rms belonging to group g, exogenous e¤ects are generated by the predetermined characteristics z igt of these …rms. In order to capture these features of group composition explicitly, I de…ne 13
The use of expected average choice rather than the realized average choice is made for analytical convenience. As noted in Blume and Durlauf (2006) , the assumption makes most sense for larger groups where the behaviors of the rest of group are not directly observable. The assumption that individuals react to expected rather than actual behaviors is not critical for the identi…cation analysis I describe below. and 6, respectively.
The unobserved term, u igt , is assumed to have the following structure:
where i captures time invariant unobserved characteristics of the …rm, including geographical location and industry e¤ects (since these two characteristics are time invariant in the data set used in this paper). Geographical e¤ects that could in ‡uence export decisions include the institutional environment and accessibility to major markets. Industry e¤ects include factor endowments and other time-invariant determinants of comparative advantage. " igt is an error term that I'll describe in detail below.
In this setup, y 6 = 0 implies that exporter concentration in group g a¤ects entry costs for …rms with no prior export experience, thus generating entry cost spillovers. If y 6 = 0, exporter concentration a¤ects export decisions independently of export status; in light of equation 1, this is interpreted as a spillover on productivity. Both y and y thus capture endogenous interactions. z and z have similar interpretations, but they measure the e¤ect of exogenous interactions on export decisions. If 6 = 0 in equation 5, the model expresses correlated e¤ects: …rms in group g tend to behave similarly because they face similar institutional environments and market fundamentals. 14 The speci…cation of (z igt ; x gt ; S gt ) for the empirical analysis of manufacturing …rms in Argentina is the following:
z igt includes: …rm size (log of total number of employees), output per worker (log of total sales of goods produced by the …rm per employee), foreign ownership dummy (equal to 1 if the majority of the …rm's shares are held by non-Argentine residents), skilled labor (proportion of employees with completed college or higher education) and R&D intensity (share of R&D expenditures in total sales).
x gt includes industry and location time-varying controls. Industry controls: producer price index in ISIC industry, export price index in ISIC industry, total exports in ISIC industry. Location controls: province population, share of public employees in province population and provincial government's per capita expenditure in education, health and infrastructure services. 15
Regarding group composition, E(y gt jg) and E(z gt jg) are estimated non-parametrically using sample data by
respectively, where N g is the number of …rms in g. 16 Excluding …rm i's decision (y igt ) or characteristic (z igt ) does not a¤ect the consistency of Y ( i)gt or Z ( i)gt and avoids a mechanic positive correlation between individual and group outcomes.
Equations 5 through 7 de…ne a dynamic binary choice decision model with unobserved heterogeneity that characterizes export decisions in the presence of entry costs and non-market interactions. There are several potential estimation strategies for this type of models. A …rst decision is whether to use a linear or non-linear estimation framework to model export decisions. Linear probability models are robust to arbitrary correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity i and the regressors, and can be used to eliminate the incidental parameters associated with the unobserved heterogeneity in …xed e¤ects probit models. Random e¤ects probit models, which parameterize the distributions of i and " igt , rely more strongly on the functional form assumptions made, are computationally more demanding and require dealing with the problem of specifying the initial conditions of the dynamic process. 17 For these reasons, the estimation approach in this paper is to use a linear probability model. 18 Substituting equations 6 and 7 into a linear probability model speci…cation of equation 5 yields the estimating equation for the econometric analysis of this paper:
It will be useful to write this equation in a compact way. Letting ( 0 ; 1 ; ; ; ) T and W igt denote the vector of explanatory variables, W igt (y igt 1 ; y igt 1 E(y gt jg); y igt 1 E(z gt jg); z igt ; E(y gt jg); E(z gt jg); x gt ; t ) equation 9 can be reformulated as
Identi…cation
Next, I study the identi…cation of non-market interactions in equation 9. Although most of the discussion is centered on dealing with the endogeneity of export status and group composition, it is essential to begin with a comment on what the causal e¤ect of interest is. An important point to acknowledge is that, in general, group composition may in ‡uence individual export decisions directly through non-market interactions such as learning or imitation processes, or indirectly through its 1 7 Hyslop (1999) provides an overview of linear and non-linear models and an application of these approaches to the analysis of labor participation decisions of married women. 1 8 Bernard and Jensen (2004) also rely on linear probability models in their econometric analysis.
e¤ect on market prices in the general equilibrium. While the direct channel is emphasized in the spillovers and social interactions literatures, Melitz (2003) provides an example of the indirect channel by showing how average …rm productivity within industry determine aggregate price and income indices that, in turn, a¤ect entry into export markets in the general equilibrium. 19 Since the objective of this paper is to learn whether group composition generates non-market interactions that in ‡uence individual export decisions, the focus is to isolate the e¤ect of the direct channel.
Therefore, even if the variation in group composition were completely exogenous in my sample it would be necessary to control for market prices as a necessary step in interpreting the correlation between export decisions and group composition as evidence of non-market interactions. This motivates the inclusion of domestic and export prices and aggregate expenditure at the industry level controls in vector x gt in the empirical analysis (see page 21).
The causes of the endogeneity of group composition in equation 9 can be grouped into two The simultaneity problem complicates the identi…cation of non-market interactions because group composition is itself determined by the behavior of group members. Hence, data on outcomes do not necessarily reveal whether group behavior actually a¤ects individual behavior, or group behavior is simply the aggregation of individual behavior. This problem was formally analyzed in Manski (1993) , and has since been also known as the 're ‡ection problem'. To illustrate Manski's argument, consider a version of equation 9 where, for the sake of the argument, there are no 1 9 See Melitz (2003, p. 1700). 2 0 Actually, Mo¢ tt (2001) adds a third category, the endogenous group membership problem, which arises from the self-selection of …rms into groups due to factors that are also correlated with the dependent variable. However, endogenous membership can be considered as a particular case of the correlated unobservables problem -see Mo¢ tt (2001, p. 65) . spillovers on entry costs; i.e. 1 = 0,
Assume, for the moment, that 11 represents a structural equation for y igt , so that
It follows that, for a given g 2 G, the mean regression of y igt on (y igt 1 ; z igt ; x igt ; i ) has the linear form E(y igt jy igt 1 ; z igt ; x gt ; i ; g) = 0 y igt 1 + z igt T + y E(y gt jg) + E(z gt jg)
Integrating this expression with respect to (y igt 1 ; z igt ; x gt ) reveals that E(y igt jg) solves the following equilibrium equation in every period t = 1; :::; T E(y gt jg) = 0 E(y gt 1 jg) + y E(y gt jg) + E(z gt jg)
Therefore, assuming y 6 = 1, Manski (1993) . 21 The last observation suggests that the existence of dynamic e¤ects, in this case arising from the presence of entry costs, may help to mitigate the simultaneity problem. However, this will be true as long as E(y gt 1 jg) is (correctly) excluded from equation 11. Intuitively, if excluded, E(y gt 1 jg) acts as an instrument for E(y gt jg) breaking the re ‡ection in the same way as exclusion restrictions are used to solve standard simultaneous equations in econometrics. This idea is formalized in the next section. Brie ‡y, the identifying restriction is that individual export decisions are not directly in ‡uenced by E(y gt 1 jg); that is, y igt 1 does not generate non-market interactions in period t once E(y gt jg) has been controlled for. 22 The assumption becomes more plausible if the value of nonmarket interactions depreciates rapidly over time. This appears to be a reasonable approximation to the case I study in this paper, considering that the average time gap between the available data points (1992, 1996, 1998 and 2001) is 3 years and the fact that, during the 1990s, manufacturing …rms in Argentina were in the midst of a radical process of structural change and adjustment to increased competition stemming from trade liberalization and a reduction of government intervention in the economy.
In turn, the problem of correlated unobservables arises if there is some individual or groupspeci…c component of the error term " igt that is correlated with the explanatory variables in equation 9. Thus, it is equivalent to a standard omitted variable problem in econometrics. The unobservables may arise from unobserved product attributes or managerial ability at the …rm level or may represent group e¤ects. As mentioned in section 3, some provinces are likely to provide …rms with institutional and economic environments that are more conducive to exporting than others. Alternatively, the co-movement of export decisions could simply re ‡ect …rms adjusting to changes in fundamentals across industries, such as export prices or transport costs, or other idiosyncratic shocks to comparative advantage. In these cases, unobservable determinants of the export decision are also correlated with z igt , E(y gt jg) or E(z gt jg).
The empirical strategy for dealing with correlated unobservables in this paper is the following.
First, I will use an estimator that allows for arbitrary correlation between time-invariant unobservables ( i ) and the explanatory variables. This feature covers some important cases mentioned above such as geographic and, to the extent they remain roughly constant over time, industry e¤ects and managerial ability. Second, I will control for several sources of time-varying correlated unobservables, including local government performance and demand shocks at the industry level (see details in page 5.1). Finally, in order to deal with any residual correlation in the error term " igt , I will use an instrumental variables strategy similar to the one outlined in the context of the simultaneity problem. Next, I turn to describing this approach.
Estimation Framework
Consistent estimation of the parameters in equation 9 requires dealing with the presence of a lagged dependent variable (export status) as a regressor and, as analyzed previously, with the endogeneity of group composition.
It is well known that OLS and standard panel data estimators yield inconsistent estimates in the presence of a lagged dependent variable and unobserved heterogeneity -see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 764) . The consistency of OLS estimators depends on the assumption that …rm heterogeneity i is uncorrelated with the regressors in W igt . This assumption is violated by equation 9, due to the presence of export status y igt 1 as an explanatory variable. Thus, a …rst step in obtaining consistent estimates is to eliminate i . The 'within'panel data (or …xed-e¤ects) estimator transforms equation 9 to express the original observations as deviations from their …rm-speci…c means. OLS is then used on the transformed equation. Consistent estimation requires the righthand side variables of equation 9 to be strictly exogenous. 23 That is, strict exogeneity requires E(" igt jW ig1 ; :::; W igT ; i ) = 0. This implies E(W igs :" igt ) = 0 for s; t = 1; :::; T and g 2 G, an assumption that is violated in equation 10 since y igt 2 W igt+1 .
In general, strict exogeneity rules out feedback e¤ects from the dependent variable y igt to future values of W igt . In the context of this paper, this is not only incompatible with the existence of entry costs in export markets, but it also rules out other phenomena of interest such learning by exporting, which involves the e¤ect of exporting activity on future …rm productivity. 24 In other words, in the presence of either entry costs or learning by exporting e¤ects, the …xed-e¤ects estimator is inconsistent.
An alternative GMM-based approach can be applied by …rst removing unobserved …rm heterogeneity i and then searching for instrumental variables. I start by relaxing strict exogeneity and introducing a set of sequential moment conditions E(" igt jW igt ; W igt 1 ; :::; W ig1 ; i ) = 0, for t = 1; :::; T
That is, the explanatory variables in equation 10 are sequentially exogenous in the sense of being uncorrelated with current and future values of " igt . However, no restriction is imposed on their correlation with past values of " igt . Below, I explain how to treat endogenous regressors, such as 2 3 The random e¤ects estimator also requires strict exogeneity in order to achieve consistency. These results are shown in Wooldridge (2002, chapter 10) .
2 4 The empirical relevance of learning by exporting is far from being settled. Clerides et al (1998) , Bernard and Bradford Jensen (1999) , Isgut (2001) and Delgado et al. (2002) First di¤erencing equation 10 to remove unobserved …rm heterogeneity i gives
Note that W igt is necessarily endogenous in this equation since, in any period t, y igt 1 = y igt 1 y igt 2 2 W igt is correlated with " igt = " igt " igt 1 . Group composition is also likely to be endogenous for the reasons given in the previous section. Next, note that sequential exogeneity implies E(W igs " igt ) = 0, for s = 1; :::; t and t = 1; :::; T . Therefore, E(W igs " igt ) = 0, for s = 1; :::; t 1 The di¤erence estimator has the statistical shortcoming that if the regressors in equation 9 are persistent, then lagged levels of W igt are weak instruments, that is, they are not highly correlated with the regressors, and so the estimated coe¢ cients may be biased. This problem is particularly serious the shorter the length of the panel is (that is, the smaller T is), see Baltagi (2005) . To overcome these problems, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a 'systems estimator'that combines the di¤erenced model in 14 with the levels model in equation 10.
In order to be able to use lagged di¤erences of the variables on the right-hand side of equation 14 as valid instruments for the regression in levels, the following identifying assumptions are introduced:
which imply that there is no correlation between the di¤erences of the regressors and the countryspeci…c e¤ect; in other words, the …rm-speci…c e¤ect and the regressors are still allowed to be arbitrarily correlated, but this correlation should be constant over time. Given 16, the following moment conditions can be added to those speci…ed above in equation 15 25 :
Endogenous regressors can be treated in a similar way as in the di¤erence estimator, by using
In a nutshell, where Arellano and Bond (1991) instrument di¤erences with levels, Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest instrumenting levels with di¤erences. The Blundell-Bond estimator stacks the data for the levels and the di¤erence equations (numbers 10 and 14, respectively) and estimates them simultaneously in a GMM framework using the moment conditions in 15 and 17. Further details can be found in Roodman and Floor (2006) . Table 5 reports the estimation results of di¤erent speci…cations of equation 9, using Blundell and Bond's (1998) GMM system estimator for dynamic panel data. 26 Every speci…cation uses instruments for export status and group composition as explained above, two-period and deeper level lags in the di¤erence equation and one-period and deeper di¤erence lags in the levels equation.
Estimation Results
Although not reported, all estimations include time dummies, export prices, and total industry exports. Industries are de…ned at the 3-digit ISIC level, but the results are qualitatively robust to changes in the level of aggregation.
The …rst two columns present an endogenous interactions model that borrows two distinctive features from usual speci…cations found in the spillovers literature. First, I assume that the impact of average export intensity at the group level is the same for every …rm belonging to a given group -i.e. it is not contingent on export status. However, I do control for export status -as in Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) . Second, I do not consider the in ‡uence of other features of group composition (exogenous interactions). In terms of the notation in equation 9, I
As in Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) , the evidence on export spillovers is very weak. In column (1), the e¤ect of export intensity on individual export decisions, y , is statistically insigni…cant. In line with the empirical literature that has analyzed the determinants of exporting at the micro level, export status and heterogeneity in …rm characteristics (output per worker, …rm size and R&D investment) are highly signi…cant. In particular, the signi…cance of export status provides evidence of the importance of entry costs in export markets. 27 Column (2) repeats this speci…cation, but instrumenting for …rm-level characteristics. The results are qualitatively invariant to this modi…cation -except in the case of R&D investment.
Columns (3), (4) and (5) explore the consequences of introducing the interaction between export status and exporter concentration at the group level to allow for a contingent e¤ect of the latter on export decisions. For the moment, I still rule out exogenous interactions (that is,
is maintained) and focus on the vector of endogenous interactions [ y ; y ]. These speci…cations di¤er in terms of the inclusion of both location controls (see page 21) and IVs for …rm-level controls.
The results show that the coe¢ cient of the interaction y is negative and becomes signi…cant at the 5% level when location controls and IVs for …rm-level controls are included. This implies that the in ‡uence of export status declines in groups where the proportion of exporters is larger. In the context of the model of section 2, this is equivalent to stating that a higher export propensity at the group level reduces entry costs into export markets. The fact that y is insigni…cant in all three speci…cations actually means that the proportion of exporters at the group level does not a¤ect the export decisions of …rms with export experience in period t 1. These results provide evidence supporting endogenous spillovers on entry costs and against endogenous spillovers on productivity.
With respect to the in ‡uence of …rm characteristics, the results in columns (3) to (5) show that export status, output per worker and …rm size remain signi…cant determinants of export decisions.
The binary indicator for foreign …rms becomes highly signi…cant in (4) and (5).
In column (6), I allow for general group composition e¤ects by allowing every individual characteristic of a …rm to potentially generate exogenous interactions on the export decisions of other …rms in the same group. These group variables are denoted with a subscript g in table 5 to distinguish them from …rm-level controls. For example, Size g is the within-group average …rm size. As in (3) to (5), the impact of group composition is allowed to be contingent on export status.
The results change considerably when exogenous interactions are explicitly introduced in the analysis. Endogenous interactions from other exporters are no longer signi…cant. Spillovers on entry costs are now driven by both average …rm size and the share of foreign …rms at the group level.
Interestingly, there's no evidence of spillovers on productivity, which were also absent in previous speci…cations. Therefore, the impact of group composition is channeled through entry costs rather than productivity. Note that the estimated coe¢ cients of average …rm size and the share of foreign …rms have opposite signs. A negative sign in the coe¢ cient of the interaction with export status z implies that larger average …rm size generates positive spillovers on entry costs. On the other hand, a higher proportion of foreign …rms at the group level generates negative spillovers on entry costs.
The …rst two columns in table 6 show that the results derived from the last speci…cation in (5) and (6). Therefore, the positive e¤ect of exporter concentration present in columns (4) and (5) of table 5 was actually driven by average …rm size at the group level.
As mentioned in the introduction, average …rm size at the group level can be viewed as a proxy for a stock of past innovations or technological frontier, 28 a group-speci…c public good that …rms can access to upgrade their products. In this interpretation, it becomes interesting to evaluate whether the intensity of the exogenous interactions generated by average …rm size on export decisions increases in smaller …rms. This hypothesis is reminiscent of Gerschenkron's (1965) 'advantage of backwardness'. In the present context, the advantage for a smaller …rm could arise from the fact that implementing innovations allows it to make larger quality improvements the further it has fallen behind the frontier. 29 The thought experiment is the following: we would like to evaluate the e¤ect of shifting the group's technological frontier while holding the size of the …rm constant; that is, to evaluate an increase in the …rm's 'distance to the frontier'. Furthermore, we'd like to assess whether this e¤ect is stronger in smaller …rms. To implement this test, I augment speci…cation (6) in table 5 by allowing the e¤ect of average …rm size to depend on the individual size of a …rm.
This requires a triple interaction between export status, Size g and Size. An additional interaction between Size and export status is also included to allow entry costs to vary with …rm size. The last column of table 6 presents the estimation results. Smaller …rms face higher entry costs (signi…cant at 5%) and the positive estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction between export status, Size_G and
Size suggests that the exogenous interactions on entry costs are weaker for larger …rms. This result provides support for the advantage of backwardness hypothesis at the 10% level.
Overall, the picture that emerges from tables 5 and 6 is that group composition plays an important role in the determination of individual export decisions, beyond the e¤ect of the …rm level determinants that have been usually emphasized in the micro literature (past export experience and …rm heterogeneity). Group composition generates non-market interactions that in ‡uence individual export decisions. As suggested by the export spillovers literature, most of this e¤ect is channeled through its in ‡uence on entry costs and is, therefore, contingent on export status. However, group composition e¤ects are not driven by the average export propensity at the group level, but by average …rm size and the share of foreign …rms.
Conclusions
This paper examined the role of group composition in shaping export decisions at the …rm level.
Particular attention was given to the hypothesis that exporters belonging to the same group reduce entry costs for other …rms considering entry. Theory indicates that the in ‡uence of group composition on entry costs changes the degree of state dependence of individual export decisions.
A proper empirical evaluation of this implication required disentangling the e¤ect of state dependence from other sources of persistence in export decisions and obtaining a source of exogenous variation in group composition. I used a dynamic panel data approach that relies on sequential moment conditions to achieve identi…cation. It would be interesting to search for other identi…cation strategies in order to provide more robust evidence on the …ndings. Nevertheless, the methodological contribution of the paper is independent of the e¤ectiveness of the identi…cation strategy used.
The results show that group composition in ‡uences individual export decisions and that most of this e¤ect is channeled through entry costs. This holds after controlling for the key determinants of export participation emphasized in recent research, past export experience and …rm heterogeneity. Interestingly, these non-market interactions are not driven by export spillovers, but by other features of group composition, namely average …rm size and the share of foreign …rms at the group level. I have provided a tentative interpretation for the e¤ect of average …rm size as a proxy for a group-speci…c technological frontier, in which non-market interactions generate a "backwardness advantage" that, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of exporting in smaller …rms. In this story, …rms become more productive (and, as a result, more prone to exporting) by tapping into the stock of innovations that have already been made by past innovators belonging to the same group. The results show that once this e¤ect is controlled for, spillovers arising from exporters to other …rms considering entry become statistically insigni…cant. Of course, nothing in this interpretation rules out a mechanism where spillovers from exporters could still impact export decisions by generating a shift in the group-speci…c technological frontier which, in my argument, was taken to be exogenously determined. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper and are left to future research.
A Appendix -Data sources
The data set used in the empirical analysis comes from a variety of sources. The …rm-level data is comprised of manufacturing …rms in Argentina, sampled in two Innovation Surveys carried out by I.N.D.E.C. (Argentina's National Statistical Agency). The …rst survey provides information for 1639 …rms in 1992 and 1996, while the second survey collected information for 1688 …rms in 1998 and 2001 Lugones 1998, 2003) . These samples were randomly drawn from the National Economic Census of 1993 and from the Input-Output Matrix survey of 1997, respectively. The surveys provide information on sales of goods produced in the …rm, educational attainment of employees, investments in innovation activities (including R&D) and ownership for the years 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001 . There is also information on the geographical location (i.e. Argentine provinces) and the industry to which …rms belong (at a 4-digit ISIC level). I also use geographical data to account for di¤erences in the institutional and economic environment in which …rms carry out their activities and interact with each other. The data was collected by the Ministry of Economy and Production of Argentina, it is publicly available through the internet and includes population levels and several indicators of overall performance of the provincial economy and local government (see page 21). 30 Finally, I constructed series of export prices for 4-digit ISIC industries using the NBER-U.N. Trade Data compiled by Robert C. Feenstra. 31 Since the latter was coded according to the SITC classi…cation, the task also required matching SITC to ISIC industries. This was done with the help of a concordance provided by the O.E.C.D., available at Jon D. Haveman's website. 32 Following Schott (2004) , the unit value of an SITC product was computed by dividing import value by import quantity. 33 Before moving on to the description of the data, it is important to point out that the empirical analysis in this paper is restricted to the subset of …rms that were sampled in both surveys, 827 …rms. The reason is that the estimation of a dynamic model of export decisions that accounts for unobserved …rm heterogeneity requires the availability of at least three data points (see section 5), while each survey provides only two. As described above, the importance of previous export experience and …rm heterogeneity as determinants of entry in export markets is well documented in the recent empirical literature.
However, restricting the analysis to a balanced panel may raise concerns of potential inferential biases due to ignoring both the attrition of …rms from the First Survey and the appearance of a set of …rms in the Second Survey that were not previously surveyed. 34 This trade-o¤ is attenuated in this study due to the fact that, by design, the set of …rms sampled in each survey were randomly drawn from two di¤erent sources (as mentioned above), a situation which resembles that of rotating panels. As shown in see Wooldridge (2002, p. 569) , in rotating panels where the decision to rotate units out of the panel is made randomly, the identifying conditions required for obtaining consistent panel data estimators are the same regardless of whether the selected or a full (unrestricted) sample are used in the estimation. Additionally, the empirical analysis in this paper is robust to systematic selection based on time-invariant and other observable characteristics of …rms. Pooled data for 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001 Pooled data for 1992, 1996, 1998, 2001 Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, y p<0.1. All regressions include …rm …xed-e¤ects, time dummies, export prices and total exports in ISIC sector.
Non-exporters Exporters
Group variables are de…ned by province and industry -at the 3-digit ISIC level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, y p<0.1. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, time, dummies, export prices and total exports in ISIC sector. Group variables are de…ned at the 3-digit ISIC level. In columns(1) and (2), ISIC industries are de…ned at 2 and 3 digits of aggregation, respectively. Columns (3) to (6) examine the sensitivity of the results column (7) of Table 5 by excluding average …rm size and proportion of foreign …rms at the group level. In column (7), entry time costs and spillovers are allowed to depend on …rm size. 
